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BOOK REVIEWS
by Charles P. Curtis, Jr., Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1947. 368 pp. $3.50.

LIONS UNDER THE THRONE,

It is natural that in a period where the personnel of the
United States Supreme Court undergoes a sudden change and
where new constitutional questions are presented, there will
be numerous efforts by authors to explain, criticize, and commend the decisions of this Court. This is true because the
Court is not only a judicial body, but it is also an important
political factor in our government. Mr. Curtis' book does not
purport to be a history of the Court, nor of the Constitution,
yet it touches on most of the important constitutional problems that have come to the Court during the period of our
national existence. Its emphasis, however, is on the 1930's
and the 1940's, during which time the Supreme Court was
called on to consider much of the so-called New Deal legislation. In this brief review it is possible to touch only a few
of the author's comments.
Lions Under the Throne reminds us that in the Constitution there is no power expressly given to the Court to declare
Acts of Congress or State Legislatures invalid. The fact, however, that the powers of government are divided between the
states and the Federal Government, and that many powers are
reserved to the citizens by the Bill of Rights requires that
there be an arbiter that can delineate these lines of power.
This arbiter might have been the Congress, but it became the
Court through the statesmanship of John Marshall, who saw
an opportunity in Marbury v. Madison to claim the power
for the Supreme Court to declare an act unconstitutional,
though that holding was unnecessary for a determination of
the issues in that case.
The Court has maintained its judicial supremacy by exercising restraint and by building up in the people the idea of
the stability of the judicial branch of the government. As Mr.
Curtis points out, the Court's powers are subject to the will of
Congress. The great bulk of the Court's jurisdiction is appellate, and this appellate jurisdiction can be withdrawn or modified by Congress at will. Congress has exercised this power
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only once, when in 1869 it withdrew the Courts jurisdiction
to hear the appeal of McCardle, a Mississippi editor, who had
been tried before a military commission under one of the Reconstruction Acts.
The Congress may also change the number of judges. It
has complete power over the enforcement of the decisions of
the Court, and it can initiate constitutional amendments to
override the decisions of the Court as it did with reference to
slavery and Federal income taxes.
It is interesting to note that the American Bar Association is considering the initiation of a proposal to amend the
Constitution to prohibit Congress from withdrawing or extensively modifying the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
The current issue of the American Bar Journal indicates that
the House of Delegates is almost evenly divided on the desirability of this change.
Mr. Curtis' comparison of the views of the old and the new
Court on state and Federal regulation and taxation of business
is particularly interesting. The old Court of VanDevanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, and justices of a similar bent
of mind, who dominated the Court during the fifty-year period
preceding 1935, grew up in an expanding country where success was achieved in an economy of free competition. These
justices felt that interference by state legislatures in the free
operation of business was so contrary to sound economics that
it was arbitrary, so arbitrary, that it was unconstitutional as
a deprivation of due process or as an interference with Congress' power under the commerce clause. At a later date when
Congress attempted to regulate under the commerce clause
and to tax for the general welfare, it was this same devotion
to a pioneer economy that led these justices to find the New
Deal legislation invalid under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments.
In this field there has been a marked change incident to
the changed personnel of the Court. Today, state legislatures
are free to enact almost any regulatory or tax legislation which
does not discriminate against commerce. For all practical purposes the Court has relegated due process to procedural matters. Policy making in the Federal field is left to Congress.
An apparent contradiction to this tendency, however, is
found in the field of civil rights. A presumption of the validity
of the state or federal regulation, running counter to the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol2/iss2/8

2

194

al.: BOOK
REVIEWS
SOUTH CAROLINAetLAW
QUARTERLY

guarantees of the first eight amendments, does not exist. The
present Court seems to feel that where there is an express
provision in the Constitution guaranteeing people against legislative invasion of a particular field, that the statute must
be closely scrutinized to be sure that it does not violate one
of these reserved rights. By interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment as incorporating the provisions of the Federal
Bill of Rights, and therefore guaranteeing these rights against
state invasion, there is today practically no difference between
the individual's protection against Federal encroachment and
his protection against state encroachment.
An interesting phase of the book is the credit given Mr.
Justice Roberts in changing the economic balance of the Court
in favor of the validity of Federal and State regulation dur*ing the 1936-1937 term and its effect in President Roosevelt's.
proposal to increase the number of justices. Mr. Curtis points
to the fact that Justice Roberts in 1934 had joined with
Hughes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardoza to sustain New York's
right to control milk. However, he voted with the VanDevanter
wing of the Court, in deciding that railroad pensions were
beyond the scope of the commerce clause and contrary to due
process. In early 1936, Justice Roberts voted with the majority
in striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act as an invasion of the field reserved to the states, joined in holding that
the regulation of coal production and wages was beyond the
reach of the commerce clause, and finally, in June, 1936, joined
in holding that New York's minimum wage statute deprived
employees of due process.
In November, 1936, shortly after the re-election of President Roosevelt, when the New York Unemployment Compensation Act was sustained by an evenly divided court, with
Justice Stone absent, the surmise was that Justice Roberts
was swinging away from the conservative block. Later in the
term this was confirmed when Justice Roberts voted with
the majority to sustain state minimum wage legislation, the
National Labor Realtions Act and Social Security.
The point is that the changed viewpoint of the Court was
affected before a single Roosevelt appointee had reached the
Bench, simply because Mr. Justice Roberts became convinced
that this regulatory and tax legislation involved policy, and
not constitutional questions.
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This book contains numerous other phases of the Supreme

Court which not only the lawyer but also the laymen will
enjoy.
DAVID W. ROBINSON*
* MIember South Carolina Bar. Member of Firm of Robinson and Robinson, Columbia,
S. C.

COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, by
Arthur Lenhoff,* Dennis & Co., Inc., Buffalo, N. Y., 1949.
1,046 pp. $8.00.
The publication of this textbook adds another important
work to the United States Case Book Series, and represents
a contribution to a field which is gaining greater prominence
in the law school curriculum-the study of legislation, its
genesis, formative processes, manner of expression and publication and substantive clarity and effect.
To the extent possible, Professor Lenhoff has adapted the
book to two general classifications: (1) The Legislative
Process as Part I, and (2) Statutory Interpretation as Part
II. An added appendix contains valuable excerpts from such
sources as the United States Code, the report of the New
York State Joint Legislative Committee and the guide used
by Arizona in drafting statutes.
The text may be generally described as an analysis and appraisal of the judicial responsibility in an age when statutory
law is blazing new trails unknown to the common law. Indicative of this fact is the comment of Professor Lenhoff:
"Nowaday, when statutory law in the common law countries has gradually penetrated fields which formerly constituted the undisputed domain of case law, the question
of a dividing line between the province of legislation and
the province which still is left to the creative development
of law in the form of judicial adjudication call for an
examination. How far statutory law has evolved and
taken the place of common law can be seen from the fact
that while in 1875, still more than 40% of the controversies which reach the Federal Supreme Court were
* Professor of Law, University of Buffalo.
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common law cases. In 1947 'cases not resting on statutes
are reduced almost to zero!' "1
The text is very comprehensive; many decisions on recent
legislation of interest not only as the product of the legislative process, but also from the substantive standpoint as well,
are included. Such far-reaching statutes as the Wagner Act,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, are
treated in many of the opinions. Other important problems
such as conflict of laws, state and federal, concurrent jurisdiction, mistakes of law, and the impact of such cases as
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, are found in the decisions.
Professor Lenhoff uses a system of analyzing through
notes and comments effectively, and many of these comments
are very penetrating, and will be found useful both to the student and practitioner.
Of particular interest is the emphasis placed upon the actual process of lawmaking-how a bill takes form, the introduction, passage, enrollment, ratification and publication. The
matter of expression, simplification and phraseology is amply
treated, and the trend now present in many states toward
code revision and progress in simplifying statutes is well
known.
Among the interesting notes is a note on page 73, entitled
"A Note on Private Acts, Local Acts, Lobbyism and Related
Legislative Matter." Another is found on page 128, entitled
"A Note on the Various Phases of Legislative Procedure." The
decision of Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), involved the
question of the impeachment of an enrolled bill by the legislative journal or other extrinsic evidence. The note following
this case shows the two rules which prevail on this subject,
namely, the "enrolled-bill rule" which accepts the enrolled
bill as conclusive evidence of its regularity and correctness,
and the "journal-entry rule" which permits the bill only as
presumptive evidence, thereby allowing impeachment from the
legislative journal.
The book really stirs a profound interest. A mere cursory
glance will re-emphasize to the student the enormous expan1. Quotation from Professor Lenhoff from Felix Frankfurter, "Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" (1947), 47 Col. L. R. 527. (See
text, page 15)
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sion of statutory law, and its influence on the life of the
everyday citizen in such matters as insured deposits, insured
savings, price supports, subsidization of private enterprise
and of education through such institutions as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Communications Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Tennessee Valley Authority
and others-all creatures of the legislative department of government. It is a challenge to the professional lawyer of
America to appreciate the significance of this fact.
Considerable emphasis is placed on the big job of drafting
statutes. Many of the cases included show that the litigation
developed as a result of ambiguity or lack of clarity in the
statute and that courts often have to interpolate to give substance to a statute. The inference of the text appears to be
that America generally has suffered from poor draftsmanship.
An example is the following comment of Professor Lenhoff:
"The draftsman of the Wagner Act, 1935, had failed to
insert a provision expressly mentioning which of the statutory norms may or may not be subject to a bargain between the parties. The omission has troubled the parties
all along. As an example, one may mention the question
whether the terms of valid individual employment contracts prevailed over those of collective bargaining contracts. It was not until 1944 that the Supreme Court pronounced that Section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act must be construed as being of the inflexible
type of statutory norms, therefore exclusive of individual
bargaining. It is almost a matter of common knowledge
that analogous legislative omissions in the drafting of
the Fair Labor Standards Act have occasioned numerous
litigations centering around the problem how far private
agreements which set up their own standards for the payment of 'work week' or 'hourly rate' are a valid basis for
overtime payments.
"Thus one is amazed that the new act remains entirely
silent on the problem. It would be very easy in drafting
regulatory laws to indicate in plain language whether
or not their terms are subject to the control of the parties." (Page 47-48 of the text.)
Another graphic example pointed to by Professor Lenhoff
is that of the Federal Employees' Liability Act and the Fair
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.Labor Standards Act. In both of these acts, federal and state
-courts are given concurrent jurisdiction. In the former, how,ever, the statute expressly provided that the removal principle
would not apply, and in the latter this provision was omitted,
-thereby occasioning much litigation.
There are an infinite number of questions found in the
text which it would be interesting- to point to here, such as the
importance of a title in a statute, and the renewed use of the
old preamble as a "statement of policy". But the scope of a
review is necessarily limited. The student, however, in a program of organized study centered around this fine text will
derive both value and fascination. Subjects such as acts in pari
'materia, correction of legislative errors, statutory interpretation with its problems of literal interpretation and administrative interpretation, the matters of findings by boards, and
rulings of such agencies as the Treasury Department and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the use of Legislative
history as a guide to interpretation, the question of obsolete
and superannuated statutes and many others are timely considered in the text. The student will find knowledge of these
matters of permanent worth.
An enormous amount of work has gone into this casebook.
It merits a place in the curriculum of the student of law.
WADE S. WEATHERFORD*
* Member of South Carolina Bar, Assistant Director of Legislative Council.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK. THE MAN AND His OPINIONS,

by John

P. Frank, * Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1949. 357 pp.

$4.00.
"My God, what's the country coming to?" was the query
seriously posed by South Carolina's late redoubtable United
States Senator, Ellison D. Smith, when he was informed that
his colleague, Senator Hugo L. Black, had been nominated to
be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
The news of the nomination was whispered to Senator Smith
by
an aide while the Senator was presiding over an executive
.session
of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.
He could no more restrain the impartation to his colleagues
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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of this bombshell than he could stem the flood tides of the sea.
Consideration of agricultural matters terminated immediately and the members assembled gave expression to their
reaction to the new nomination. The more conservative members considered the nomination the worst in the long and
colorful history of the United States Supreme Court and
fraught with direst implications. They believed the nominee
totally unfit, mentally, professionally, temperamentally and
otherwise to serve on the Supreme Court. They stated the appointment was an insult to the United States Senate as well
as to the entire nation. It was the pay-off, so they explained,
for Black's support of the recent infamous court-packing plan
which had split the Senate into warring camps as no other
measure within a decade, and other liberal legislation such as
the Wage and Hour Bill, various WPA and PWA appropriations, Social Security legislation, the Wagner Labor Relations'
Bill and other proposals, which were anathema to the conservative members of the Committee, Democrats and Republicans
alike. No mention was then made of his Klan membership, the
revelation of which later precipitated a crisis of such portentiousness that Mr. Justice Black, who had already been
confirmed when the news leaked out, felt constrained to make
a nation-wide radio address of explanation, which it is stated
was heard by the largest audience in history, with the exception of King Edward VIII's abdication message.
The liberals in the Committee were equally stunned by the
nomination as they had never considered Senator Black as
being possessed of a judicial temperament, but thought of him
as being of the fighting, crusading type, whose leadership in
the Senate was invaluable in bringing about the adoption of
the New Deal program. Later they, with the other liberals of
the Senate, prepared their case in behalf of the nomination
and were successful in obtaining confirmation by a vote of 63
to 16, with 10 Republicans and 6 conservative Democrats voting against the nominee and 17 abstaining from voting.
A forthright answer to Senator Smith's query as to what
would become of the country with Mr. Justice Black on the
Supreme Court may be found in Professor John P. Frank's
biographical sketch: Mr. Justice Black. The Man and His
Opinions. The author, a professor at the Indiana School of
Law, is particularly well qualified to write this book, for he
was at one time law clerk for Justice Black, thus having an
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opportunity to know him well, and has devoted a considerable
part of his time to studying the personalities who have composed the Supreme Court. While it would not be unnatural to
expect that Frank's account would be biased because of his
relationship with Justice Black, his presentation of Justice
Black's life and his impact upon the Court is forthright, fair
and unprejudiced. The author simply presents the salient facts
in the life of Justice Black, together with a collection of his
most important opinions, leaving to each reader the task of
evaluating his significance in the political and judicial history
of America.
"The biographical sketch", it is stated in the author's
preface, "makes very little attempt to estimate the validity of
the hatred or the praise (for Justice Black). It is far too early
to attempt Black's critical biography, and this sketch makes
no such pretense. It is offered as a short account of salient
events in a full life."
This book is divided into two parts, the first of which is
designated "The Man" and the other "His Opinions". The first
part describes the life of Justice Black from his birth in Clay
County, Alabama, in 1886, up through the first ten years on
the Supreme Court. Emphasis is placed on his modest background which influenced his early adoption of the general
objectives of the Populists and of the liberal Democrats of the
Nineties. This political philosophy has been steadfastly adhered to by Justice Black throughout his life and was applied
with especial force and vigor when the various New Deal
measures were under consideration in the Senate. This part
of the book gives an interesting and full account of Black's
Alabama home life, his education, his law practice, his endeavors to improve the administration of justice while he was
serving as a police judge in Alabama, his colorful political
campaigns, his record in the Senate, where he was one of the
most effective and vocal proponents of the Wage and Hour
Bill and other liberal measures, and his part in the spectacular
investigation of the public utility holding companies. An interesting account is given of Black's appointment to the Supreme Court, with the ensuing storm which followed, including the controversy over his Klan membership, and his much
publicized "feud" with Justice Jackson, which involved the
propriety of Black's hearing a case presented by an ex-partner
of many years before.
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The second part of the book contains excerpts from 34 of
the more than 300 written opinions filed by Justice Black
during his first ten years on the Supreme Court. These opinions are prefaced by illuminating comments setting forth the
circumstances of each case, pointing out the social or political
implications and the votes of each Justice. A consideration of
these excerpts gives the reader the best insight into Black's
political, economic and judicial philosophy.
The opinions are grouped under the following classifications: I. Control of the Economy: (a) Extent of Federal Power; (b) Extent of State Power; (c) Problems of Regulation.
II. Civil Rights: (a) Basic Theory; (b) Speech, Press, Religion; (c) Fair Trial; (d) Marriage and Divorce; and (e)
Aliens.
I heartily concur with the opinion expressed in the introduction by Charles A. Beard that "Mr. Frank's volume should
be judicially received and thoughtfully examined by each citizen concerned with the fortunes and fate of the Republic."
J. W. BRADFORD*

* Member of the South Carolina Bar. Member of Firm of Mays, Featherstone and
Bradford, Greenwood, S. C. EditWs Note-Mr. Bradford, at the time of the appointment
of Justice Black, was Secretary of the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry.
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